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ABSTRACT

Bell, James. M.A., International and Comparative Politics Graduate Program, Wright State University,
2018. Economic Statecraft and Ethnicity in China

How do authoritarian states prioritize between economic growth and territorial integrity? China, as an
authoritarian state, is growing in political and economic capacity. By examining challenges to China’s
territorial integrity, this study examines Chinese responses to visits by the Dalai Lama with government
officials in Germany and Austria, as well as official visits by Uyghur dissidents to Germany and Turkey.
Analyzing quarterly trade data and specific trade sectors with author created rating schema, patterns
emerge. Employing a hybrid framework introduced by Sverdrup-Thygeson (2015), this study analyzes
Chinese actions against perceived offending states. This study finds that levels of threshold are present in
Chinese responses to perceived dissident threats. The conclusions of this study help answer how China
prioritize responses to individuals bringing international attention to domestic issues and challenging
Chinese state authority, these findings help indicate thresholds for actions taken by other authoritarian
states.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review and Methods
I.

Introduction:
China’s rise as an economic and military power continues to reshape the framework of

East Asia, as well as China’s interaction with the world. The prowess of the second largest
economy continues to tilt some of the world’s economic gravity toward East Asia. Within the
coming decades, China is expected to surpass the United States as the world’s leading economy
(Audino, Clarry, and Hawksworth, 2017). A growing economy can signal greater capacity to
influence other countries’ policies and behavior to China’s liking. The ramifications are of
increasing importance, as countries, interests groups, and academics learn what is most vital to
China, how its leaders will respond to its interests, and what can been observed in these
responses. Specifically, how far China will risk harm to its economic interests to challenge
foreign leaders’ positions on dissidents who speak out against Beijing’s policies? I will examine
these issues with particular attention to China’s responses to Uyghur activism, specifically in its
state to state relations. Specifically, I will examine China’s trade relations with two states,
Germany and Turkey. Both countries provide good case studies to potentially better understand
what may be Chinese leaders’ competing core interests: territorial integrity and economic
growth. Germany and Turkey both host vocal and active Uyghur dissidents on the international
stage while also being important trading partners with China. Examining these cases should
provide insight into how Chinese leaders manage Uyghur activism while respecting the wishes
of foreign politicians and business interests.
China’s economic growth has oriented its policy and influence beyond its periphery.
Specifically, western provinces such as Tibet and Xinjiang now are central to Beijing’s
continued expansion of influence, opening of markets, and accomplishment of security goals.
1

Xinjiang, the largest and western-most province in China, neighbors eight countries, five of
which were formerly part of the Soviet Union. Xinjiang is believed to hold substantial untouched
coal, oil, and natural gas reverses while already outproducing all other provinces in China to
claim approximately 30% of China’s natural gas production and the third largest oil output
among provinces (Cho and Seo, 2013, p. 306-307). The importance of Xinjiang has grown with
the advent of transnational terrorism and need for influence over Central Asia for security
purposes (Cho and Seo, 2013). Economic growth is considered to be of importance to the
security of the political status quo. China’s increased economic ties with other countries have
also led to greater utilization of imported fuel, much of this running through Xinjiang (Cho and
Seo, 2013). The backdrop is a precarious ethnic situation which has often pitted the largest ethnic
group in Xinjiang, the Turkic Uyghurs, against the influx of Han Chinese, who account for 54%
and 46% of the population respectively as of 2008 (Cho and Seo, 2013). The need to resolve
ethnic tensions and Uyghur calls for separation from China continues to grow with importance as
economic ties, energy reliance, and need to exert influence for security all expand.
Currently, there is a void in research on how China responds to foreign government’s
official reception of dissidents, especially Uyghur dissidents. However, extensive research has
been conducted on how China responds to other dissident activities abroad (Ettenson, Klein, and
Morris, 1998; Fuchs and Klann, 2013; Shichor, 2009; 2013; Sverdrup-Thygeson, 2015).
Research into the so-called “Dalai Lama effect,” observed by Fuchs and Klann (2013) shows
China’s economic punishment through the decline in imports from countries hosting the Dalai
Lama in certain sectors for a period of roughly two years. Further research contrasting the “Dalai
Lama effect” with similar approaches to other dissidents may provide insight into the manner in
which China can be expected to react to similar dissidents. I contend that the understanding of
2

why Chinese leaders react in this manner can be found in the articulation of their “core
interests.” This provides the framework to understand whether or not Chinese leaders define
Uyghur dissidence in a category of core interests or as a peripheral concern. To examine this
point, data will be reviewed on the subject of China’s economic diplomacy on dissident activities
and Uyghur activity in Xinjiang.
II.

Literature Review:
To answer the question of how and why Chinese leaders respond, this literature review

will focus on four areas of interests: China’s core interests and foreign policy engagement,
China’s use of economic statecraft, the Dalai Lama effect, and Uyghur activity in Xinjiang.
The trends in which China engages the wider world in its foreign policy are up for
debate, to the extent to which China is assertive or not in the region and broader international
environment. But scholars have assessed what Chinese leaders recognize as “core interests,”
issues on which Chinese leaders will not compromise. These issues are outlined in China’s
various white papers which include “state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and
national reunification,” among other issues related to social stability and development (Breslin,
Xiao, and Zeng, 2015, p. 246) The debate centers on where the boundaries are between China’s
core issues and non-core issues and the extent to which China is willing to uphold redlines
(Breslin, Xiao, and Zeng, 2015). Core interests of territorial integrity, such as claims on the
Diayou islands in the East China Sea and claims in the South China Sea, have become more
prominent as the desire to ensure security in the first island chain and access to energy grow,
particularly as capacity to extend influence into these areas expand.
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In some areas, China increasingly considers its citizens’ wishes on particular national
issues which promote the hand of nationalist policies, such as Chinese leaders’ claims on the
Diayou islands in the East China Sea, in part because of a growing social media presence and
independent press (Wei, 2010, p. 100). Wei argues this results in amplified sensitivity to the
remnants of territory lost to Japan and other western powers, making the issue of unresolved
territorial disputes sensitive (p. 100; Lim, 2012).
The era in which China lost significant amount of territory at the hands of western
powers and Japan is often termed the Century of Humiliation (~1839-1949). The implication is
that China has become more assertive in its foreign policy; as it reacts to the wishes of its
citizens (Christisen, 2011 p. 61). As Zheng Wang (2014) argues, the loss of greatness and impact
from this trauma has led to both a bond between the Chinese people and need to reclaim what
has been lost, while pushing to keep foreign out of the national process (p. 69).
Wei (2010) argues that China has not changed its assertiveness in substantive foreign
policy but has shifted its tone (p. 101). Its leaders continue to enforce its interests with new
capacity, militarily, diplomatically, and economically (p. 101-103; Wu, 2009).
Chinese Economic Statecraft & Dalai Lama Effect:
Economic statecraft has been a topic of study, especially as statistical methods and data
have allowed for further inquiry. One of the earlier trends in studying economic statecraft led to
the creation of the “animosity model” and the role of the individual in effecting a drop in imports
from foreign countries into China (Ettenson, Klein, and Morris, 1998). Integrating markets
globally gave individual consumers the choice to decide what to buy and when to buy (89).
Ettenson, Klein, and Morris (1998) propose a model which hypothesizes previous military
4

conflicts and continuing military, economic, and political tensions will affect how consumers
buy a product based on the country location of the firm or place of manufacture (90). Results
from statistical data and surveys from China show that this animosity has a direct effect on one’s
willingness to buy and own a product from manufactured or a firm from the country which is
disliked, independent of product quality (Ettenson, Klein, and Morris, 1998). The resulting
model indicates that individuals can be influenced by previous and ongoing hostilities which can
have a negative outcome for a foreign firm or product.
Wu (2009) argues that, as an authoritarian state, China is better suited than democratic
states to bend countries to its interests. Chinese leaders use veiled threats and cross-issue
bargaining when core interests are threatened (p. 84-85). This allows for the exertion of pressure
on multinational companies (p. 84-85). Wu terms the growth of China’s economy and the
industrial west’s dependence on China for its own growth as “reverse dependence” which allows
for increased leverage over democratic states in the west (p. 86-87).
Chinese economic statecraft research has been spurred by findings in an empirical study
by Fuchs and Klann (2013). The authors attempt to answer the question of whether or not threats
by China’s government are carried out when the Dalai Lama visits other countries, especially as
dependence on China’s economic ties continues to grow. Trade data from China and countries
which the Dalai Lama visited from a period of 1991-2008 were examined. Empirical tests show
that heads of state receiving the Dalai Lama were faced with economic punishment from China,
which usually subsides after a period of two years (Fuchs and Klann, p. 175). Exports to China
dropped for two by 16.9%, particularly in the sector of machinery (p. 165).
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Similar research following the “Dalai Lama Effect” looked into how China responds to
individual actors. Sverdrup-Thygeson (2015) expands findings on the “Dalai Lama Effect” to
test whether or not China leverages economic interests in dealing with other countries,
specifically if Norway was punished for granting the Nobel Peace prize to Liu Xiaobo. Analysis
shows that Chinese leaders have been selective in the sectors which they restrict. In the case of
Norway, the salmon industry, for example, highly symbolic to Norway, experienced a decrease
in exports to China (112-114). The results also show that China did not target industries which
would be difficult to replace on the international market, including green technology, energy, and
shipping, which, according to the Sverdrup-Thygeson, is because these sectors provide
contributions to China’s economy (116-117). Findings show that trade compatibility and China’s
ability to punish countries are taken into account when resulting accounts will impose a cost on
itself.
Uyghur Dissidence & Identity in China:
In 2009, violence in Xinjiang spurred researchers to focus on different dimensions in the
relationship between Uyghur identity in western China, China’s policies in ethnic minority
regions, and connections with the Islamic world and international Uyghur groups.
Some scholars link China’s policies and actions to the increase in violence (Clarke, 2015;
Van Wie Davis, 2008). In defining China’s consolidation in the region through economic
investment in Xinjiang and Central Asia, Clarke (2015), argues that, after terrorist incidents in
2001, China revamped Uyghur policy, causing discontent among the group. China increased
“counter-terrorism” operations, including restricting religious activities of Uyghurs, linked
violent incidents to international groups, all of which has led to an intensification of positions
(Clarke, 2015). Van Wie Davis similarly argues that China has harshly responded in the
6

aftermath of 9/11 (2008). Since 2001, Chinese police have cracked down on Uyghur
communities (Clarke, 2015; Lim, 2012). Uyghur separatist activity experienced demonstrable
shifts, including suicide bombings. China’s government cracked down on anyone who can be
perceived as promoting separatist activity, such as the imprisonment of the Uyghur academic,
Ilham Tohti (Clarke, 2015, p. 139-142).
Other scholars focus on the rising discontent among the Uyghur population. Such
research focus on mass migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang, restrictions and crackdowns on
religious practices, and economic inequality in the form of underdevelopment and lower pay
(Lim, 2012; Van Wie Davis, 2008). Another emphasis is on Uyghur nationalism, which has been
reinforced by China’s practices, which draw stark ethnic lines between the Uyghur people and
the Han people (Lim, 2012). This issue is also looked at through the Soviet Union’s involvement
in helping to foster a separate and distinct Uyghur identity from the rest of China (Lim, 2012).
Chinese leaders’ attention to reducing and stopping foreign influence and connections in
Xinjiang has led researchers to examine the interaction of China with other states which have
Uyghur populations. Researchers have an interest in Turkey because of shared Muslim and
Turkic identity connections to the Uyghurs. (Shichor, 2009). Beijing leaders increasingly exert
pressure on Turkey to rein in ideology and statements which may spur secessionist activity, to
which Turkey has largely complied (Shichor, 2009). Turkey’s compliance with China’s pressure
shifted researchers focus to Western Europe (Shichor, 2009; Shichor, 2013). Shichor (2013)
argues that China’s rhetoric on the Uyghur problem has not led to economic pressure being
exerted on Germany, due to the need for upstream technology for China’s economic purposes.
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Trends in The Literature:
China’s emphasis on economic statecraft is examined by works of multiple scholars.
Ettenson, Klein, and Morris (1998) provide a model which looks at the role of the individual’s
purchasing patterns related to the animosity held to the origination of the product or firm of the
product. A strength of this model is highlighting that consumers’ increasing choices for
consumption of products allow them to make choices which may punish a company or product
for its association with a past or ongoing grievance. However, this model only looks at behavior
towards Japanese firms and does not look at behavior towards western countries or other
countries which support initiatives threatening to the integrity of the Chinese state. The level of
analysis at the individual level contributes to the field and subsequent analysis, but does not look
at the extent to which the government has played a role in shaping perceptions of foreign firms
and products or the divergence in opinion between the government and individuals.
Fuchs and Klann’s research shows that hosting official visits by the Dalai Lama result in
decreased exports to China. The scope of research offers positive insights into how China deals
with the Dalai Lama but does not examine other cases where a similar reaction from China may
be expected. Similarly, the research does not fully examine the extent punishment from
consumers may appear in a drop in exports to China, although this is unlikely given that the
sector which has the greatest drop in exports is machinery.
Expanding upon the research of Fuch and Klann (2013), Sverdrup-Thygeson (2015)
looks at whether or not Chinese leaders followed through on threats to economically punish
Norway for Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Peace Prize in 2010. Their results show that Chinese leaders can
be selective in the sectors which they restrict, choosing to target an industry symbolic of
Norway, salmon, while not targeting industries which input into the Chinese economy, such as
8

shipping (Sverdrup-Thygeson, 2015). A strength of this work is the examination of whether
China’s rhetoric is carried out via policy. Sverdrup-Thygeson (2015) indicates that trade has
between the two countries have not dropped, with the exception of salmon, an export symbolic
of Norway. Sverdrup-Thygeson incorporates the work of Ettenson, Klein, and Morris (1998) to
test whether or not it is consumers which are punishing Norway, results from good interviews
and examination of policies from China show that consumers were largely unaware of Liu’s
receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize. The analysis shows that governments can choose to penalize
without incorporating consumers’ perception of the situation. Sverdrup-Thygeson proposes that
China does not punish other Norwegian sectors because they are needed for China’s economy.
Wu (2009) finds similar results and uses the case study of France and Germany, finding that
France was subsequently rebuked for meeting the Dalai Lama but Germany was not due to
economic inputs to China’s economy.
Wu (2009) finds that China is able to reprimand multinational companies that do not
concede to its wishes, rather than to influence states. Findings show that countries can be
punished, this is in contrast with the findings of Shichor (2013) which finds that Germany has
not been punished, nor would China move to sanction Germany because China’s economy is
dependent on the technological expertise Germany offers. Wu’s work (2009) focuses on the
capacity of China to contrasting with findings of Shichor and punishment of Germany because of
freedom of speech but may be useful because it focuses on multinational firms and not
individuals. Shichor (2013) instead focuses on the limits of China’s reach.
Shichor’s earlier work (2009) shows that China influences other countries, specifically
Turkey. Even with the Turkic interest in Uyghurs, Turkey has followed China’s wishes because
of financial incentives. But, Shichor’s work (2009) shows that Turkey will prioritize China’s
9

wishes but officials look the other way when protests of solidarity begin and themselves have
sympathy for the Uyghur people. His later work (2013) contrasts in that China is willing,
potentially, to take action against Turkey and Turkey will bend while Germany will not. Gaps
remain in how China responds to a wider array of countries for issues with Xinjiang.
Chinese leaders appear increasingly worried about territorial issues and now have the
capacity to act on their concerns. Fuchs and Klann (2013) highlight that China now has the
capacity to exert pressure on other countries, but this pressure is limited to certain sectors which
do not greatly harm Chinese economic output (Shichor, 2013; Sverdrup-Thygeson, 2015). But
gaps in China’s willingness and capacity to exert pressure on other core interests remain, such as
Uyghur separatism. The works which have looked at these issues are largely qualitative (Shichor,
2009; 2013). They do not examine the issues to the same extent as Fuchs and Klann (2013) and
Sverdrup-Thygeson (2015).
Scholars who examine Uyghur identity and separatist tendencies significantly vary. Each
provides understanding into the identity and role of China’s government in solidifying the
identity of the Uyghur people. The insights from these works are similar to the argument put
forth by Wei (2010) although the works on Uyghur identity do say that the issues run into Han
nationalism although they do not link it to China’ s beholdeness to Han nationalism, an argument
also put forth by Wei (2010). The fluidity on the emphasis placed on China’s core interests
allows for emphasis to shift based on need (Breslin, Xiao, Zeng, 2015) and as is also in line with
hardening identity lines between the Uyghur people and the Han (Clark, 2015).

10

III.

Research Methodology:
Few have examined how China responds to governments that host Uyghur dissidents.

Instances of hosting dissidents include heads of federal branches of government or prominent
leaders receiving dissidents for events, meetings, and/ or greeting. Studying the Uyghur case
provides insight into the competition between one core interest of economic growth and another
core interest of territorial integrity and how leaders prioritize one over the other. It seems both
are needed to maintain and advance the PRC status-quo. Furthermore, evaluating Chinese
leaders’ responses to Uyghur activism can be juxtapositioned with the cases of Tibet and
Taiwan, both more thoroughly studied. The similarities and differences can be examined for
relevance to stakeholders.
Germany and Turkey provide good contexts in which to examine these dynamics.
Because Tibet is examined in Chapter two, Austria will be examined due to the large number of
visits the Dalai Lama paid there. Germany has high trade volume with China (see Figure 1.1),
and China depends on German technology to sustain output from several sectors. In addition, the
differences in freedom of speech and presence of Uyghur activist groups which coordinate
internationally present issues for contention between leaders of Germany and China. It is
estimated that 700-800 Uyghurs live in Germany (Shichor, 2013, p. 613). The Uyghur
population in Germany is greatly involved internationally and home to several international
Uyghur activist groups and members, including the World Uyghur Congress which addresses
Uyghur interests (Shichor, 2013, p. 618). Likewise, Turkey shares a large population of Uyghurs
and has deeper ethnic roots as the Uyghurs are a Turkic people. The support given to the Uyghur
population, growing economic ties and Chinese vie for influence in the Middle East present as
case study for competing interests.
11

Figure 1.1: Profile of Germany’s and Turkey’s Trade with China
Volume

Of total trade

German exports

$85,350,436

6.37%

German imports

$105,289,7531

9.93%

Turkic exports

$2,329,371

1.63%

Turkic imports

$25,440,454

12.81%

Source: Trade Map of the International Trade Centre. (https://www.trademap.org)

Trade relations will be used to examine events from 2002 to 2008 to capture the
timeframe identified by Fuchs and Klann (2013) as statistically significant, using one year
preceding and approximately two years after to account for macro-environment and seasonal
trade fluctuations. The quantitative section of my research will employ the methodology used in
Sverdrup-Thygeson’s (2015) research. To analyze the trade relationship between China and both
Germany, Turkey, and Austria, exports will be analyzed in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule
(HTS) 84 and 87 groups, analogous to the trade group identified by Fuchs and Klann (2013) as
vulnerable to Chinese retaliation. Export data of these sectors will be collected from the official
statistical agency of each perceived offending country and represented and analyzed in the form
the data is presented. For instance, in the case of Germany, I will rely on data from EuroStat
which collects official trade data from Germany. Overall exports will be captured per quarter to
determine a general trend and be able to account for seasonal changes. To account for anomalies
in trade, a collection of other countries for context will be used to provide greater fidelity in
results. Countries’ export data to China will examine: Australia, the United States, the Republic
of Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Myanmar, and the Czech Republic. In each instance
of examination, each country will be compared against two other countries. Trade data from
these states will be collected from the International Trade Centre. To the degree that variance is
12

observed in exports from Turkey, Germany, and Austria it will be compared to visits and
activities from the Dalai Lama and high-level Uyghur dissidents and rhetoric from Chinese
leaders. Further qualitative analysis will examine high level Chinese leaders’ statements and
warnings for potential correlation between an action of a perceived offending country and a drop
in exports from this country to China. Statements from the official English translations from
Xinhua, the “new China” news agency will be analyzed. Results from examining statements
from high-level Chinese officials may show punishment below the threshold of economic
statecraft, such as halting official visits and/or ongoing economic negotiations.
There are four expected findings in this research:
1. Chinese leaders will explicitly threaten Turkish and German leaders with unspecified
repercussions for engaging with Uyghur activists and make clear such engagements will
harm relations with China;
2. Chinese leaders will not take punitive economic measures against Germany due to
Chinese sectors being dependent on German exports as inputs to produce exports;
3. Chinese leaders will not take punitive economic measures against Turkey because
Turkish leaders will cave to Chinese leaders’ warnings on resulting damage to ties
between the two countries;
4. In the case of Germany and Turkey, Chinese leaders will snub the perceived offending
party by cancelling visas and trips for bilateral purposes.
Chapter two will examine China’s capacity to respond to other perceived separatist
activity in Taiwan and Tibet. The chapter will begin by exploring recent responses and history to
Taiwanese and Tibetan activism, domestically and internationally. The latter part of this chapter
will seek to replicate Sverdrup-Thygeson’s (2015) methodology in examining the findings of
13

Fuchs and Klann (2015) to use for analysis in the Uyghur case. The chapter will conclude by
analyzing the findings.
Chapter three will start by examining in greater detail Uyghur activism across recent
history and geographic boundaries. Recent Uyghur activism will be analyzed against past
developments and incidents to better understand Uyghur activists’ activities and how Chinese
leaders respond and preempt activism. The remainder of the chapter will be devoted to
replicating Sverdrup-Thygeson’s methodology in the Uyghur case to determine the ways in
which China has responded to Uyghur activism in Germany and Turkey.
Chapter four will conclude the discussion on findings and analyzed. Findings should
illuminate core versus non-core interests for Chinese leaders in dealing with Tibetan and Uyghur
activists. Recommended future areas of research on core interests and Uyghur activism will be
proposed.
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Chapter Two: Activists and Chinese Responses to the Dalai Lama:
I.

Introduction:
This chapter examines the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) relationship with Taiwan

and Tibet. It looks at recent and historical reasons for separatist movements in Taiwan and Tibet,
as well as foreign support. It also discusses the CCP’s perception and responses to these
movements. In further examining the CCP’s capacity to respond, Sverdrup-Thygeson’s (2015)
methodology and an author derived rating schema are applied to try to replicate the findings of
Fuchs and Klann (2015) to examine to what extent the new methodology shifts the results.
II.

Perceived Separatist Challenges to the CCP

Taiwan: Background & Challenges:
The Kuomintang (KMT), the ruling nationalist party during the Chinese civil war (19271950) fought the CCP for political control of a single China. Following the KMT’s withdrawal to
Taiwan in 1949, the KMT completed their retreat to Taiwan where they had established a
stronghold since 1945. Under successive leadership, the CCP has staked claim to Taiwan as part
of China, a status which is increasingly refuted by many in Taiwan. Likewise, Taiwan retained
claim to the whole of China—an assertion that began to shift in the late 1990s as Taiwan
increasingly crafted an identity independent of mainland China.
For decades after the retreat of the KMT to Taiwan and the CCP consolidation of its
jurisdiction in mainland China, both governments have maintained a One-China Policy. In the
case of Taiwan, the KMT (in power from 1949-2000, then again from 2008-2016) views itself
as the sole, legitimate China, including over the mainland. This policy was maintained and
strengthened in the “1992 Consensus,” in which both CCP and KMT officials stated the
existence of a single China and acknowledged the political realities from the perspective of each
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side (Kan, 2013, p. 46). During the early decades of the PRC, many countries, including the
United States, recognized Taiwan as the legitimate government of China until the 1970’s. In
1972, the Shanghai Communiqué was signed between China and the United States which
formalized a joint recognition of “one China.” This was a prerequisite for the establishment of
relations between the two countries in 1979, which saw Washington DC flip its recognition of
the leading forces of China from Taipei to Beijing (Chang, 2014, p. 301). However, this divide
continues: as of mid-2018, 19 member-states of the United Nations members continue to
recognize Taiwan as its own state.
Beijing’s policy toward Taiwan is motivated by the existential concern that Taiwanese
leaders pursuing an independent course challenge the CCP’s domestic supremacy, as it sets a
precedent for other secessionist groups. Secondly, Taiwan represents a strategic island near
China’s shore which could be a base or subordinate to a hostile foreign power. The United States
maintained a military presence in Taiwan until the 1970’s (Kan, 2013, p. 32). Instances of United
States’ military support and presence in Taiwan included the 327 th Air Division which was
charged with responsibility for United States’ military assets in Taiwan as well as logistical,
administrative, and service support for United States military and agencies in Taiwan (“History
of the US Air Force in Taiwan” Taipei Air Station). Beijing’s leaders are aware of the threat
posed by foreign forces in Taiwan, as captured in a quote from General Douglas MacArthur
viewing Taiwan as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier” (Time, 1950, p. 12). Both issues potentially
represent existential threats to the CCP. However, with these two major considerations, among
others, policy towards Taiwan and its activists have shifted over the years.
Chinese leaders’ policies towards Taiwan have vacillated between engagement and
pressure. Full military invasion remains a possibility that is often raised, including with the
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passage of the Anti-Secessionist Bill (2005) which threatens to employ “non-peaceful means” to
protect China’s sovereignty (Armitage, 2005). This policy evolved from Mao’s repeated moves
in the 1950’s to take Taiwan by force, actions that increased United States support for Taiwan’s
jurisdiction. In one case, Mao’s policies provoked a threat from the United States to use force
(including nuclear weapons) to stop Beijing in their efforts to take Taiwan by other-thanpeaceful means (Chang, 2014, p. 301). Diplomatic policies since the 1950’s have continued to
shift, especially with the major diplomatic changes in the 1970’s.
Leaders in Beijing have sought to offer carrots to Taiwan, in the form of economic
incentives and even the crafting of a possible “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement
proposed by Deng Xiaoping (Chang, 2014). This has left some room for Taiwan’s autonomy on
economic matters, but not on political issues, which may lend legitimacy to Taiwan being a
separate entity from Beijing and thus inviting repercussions. One particularly consequential
incident took place in 1996, when Taiwan’s president Lee Teng-hui visited Cornell University
(his alma mater) after accepting an invitation by the student body to speak. This trip was
perceived by Beijing as the United States’ reneging on the “One-China policy” (Chang, 2014, p.
304). Beijing signaled resolve by firing missiles into the Taiwan Strait; the United States
responded by placing two aircraft battle groups into region (Chang, 2014, p.305).
However, the extraordinary steps Beijing’s leaders appear to be willing to take when
threatened with increased Taiwanese legitimacy do not easily apply to Tibet or Xinjiang. For
one, Taiwan operates under de facto self-rule. In addition, Taiwan also has (limited) state-to-state
ties and military relationships which go beyond the economic ties which Beijing leaders accept.
The United States maintains informal ties such as American Institute in Taiwan, which houses
United States’ diplomats and coordinates economic ties between the US and Taiwan. Other
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states, including Australia and Germany, maintain informal ties with Taiwan as well. Taiwan
poses a unique case for testing the resolve of Beijing leaders, but may not easily lend itself to
better understanding separatist movements stemming from controlled provinces and territories
within China, such as Tibet and Xinjiang.
In the case of Taiwan, a select few agitators, from the perspective of Beijing, threaten
calm Cross-Strait relations. In particular, Lee Teng-hui has irked the CCP. Lee brought
international attention to interests of the KMT and the cause of Taiwanese independence. As
Hsieh (2002) describes, there is a divergence on three important issues: national identity, security,

and business interest (p. 116). For national identity, Lee was ambiguous on the issue of greater
independence but was notably wary of moving towards re-unification as greatly as his
predecessors were, on the security and business interests, Lee sought to diversify business ties
away from mainland China, as well as strengthen resolve over security issues (p. 117-118).
Growing divergence on these issues, especially after growing tensions throughout the latter part
of Lee’s tenure, surely lessened the common ground on Cross-Strait issues further provoking
instability as a perceived agitation from the perspective of the CCP ( Hsieh, 2002). A second
agitator from the perspective of the CCP is former President Chen Shui-bian, the first elected
leader from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Although from the DPP, Chen promised
not to pursue independence but nominated many pro-independence individuals to the highest
levels of his administration (Copper, 2008, p. 187). Other actions perceived as hostile by the
CCP, included disparaging ethnic Han in Taiwan and questioning the 1992 Consensus (Copper,
2008, p. 188). These actions threatened the status-quo as Chen Shui-bian appeared to be moving
towards independence. During his administration, the CCP was successful in blocking many
initiatives for Taiwan to expand diplomatic relationships with other states (Copper, 2008, p.
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188). More recently, DPP Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, elected in 2016, has been
perceived as an agitator of Cross-Strait relations from the perspective of the CCP. Although the
CCP has sought to maintain the status-quo, there is a deep anguish on Tsai’s positions on
Taiwan’s identity, so the CCP has exerted a good deal of political and economic pressure in the
form of reduced political ties for Taiwan (e.g., in 2016 Gambia flipped recognition of one China
from Taiwan to the PRC). (Brown and Scott, 2016, p. 69-70). The CCP has demonstrated its
ability to respond to individual leaders who do not suit CCP interests.
Although the Taiwan case may not easily lend itself to further understanding secessionist
activity in Mainland China, the role of leaders outside of the CCP’s control does. For instance,
the oscillation between Beijing’s use of carrots or sticks often correlates with the positions of
leaders in power at that time. Recently, some have observed that the CCP has shifted to applying
pressure on Taiwan due to the DPP leader Tsai Ing-wen coming to power in 2016 (Brown and
Scott, 2016; Guo, 2017). During her short tenure, she has travelled to several countries, including
Fiji, to promote a stronger international political role for her island. This initiative was met with
swift, sharp criticism from the Foreign Ministry (Guo, 2017, CRI).
Tibet: Background & Challenges:
Tibet’s history within China’s dynastic system ebbed and flowed for more than a
thousand years. The tension displayed between the current Dalai Lama (the 14th reincarnation)
and Beijing’s leaders draws on contested perceptions of autonomy. Many Tibetans argue that the
relationship between China and the Tibetan people was of a religious nature, in which borders
were not explicitly drawn between the two societies but Tibet largely ran its own autonomous
affairs (Davis, 2011, p. 32). Tibetan influence reached beyond the present day Tibet Autonomous
Region into an area known as Cholka-Sum, which is the greatest extent of cultural Tibetan
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influence (Lama, 2012). The tension displayed between the current Dalai Lama and Beijing’s
leaders draws on contested perceptions of autonomy. CCP officials contend control of Tibet
since Yuan Dynasty (1270-1368) (Davis, 2011, p. 32). However, following the collapse of the
Qing Dynasty (1912), Tibet exercised self-rule until shortly after the PRC was established in
1949. In 1950, CCP leaders forced negotiations on the status of Tibet and its relationship with
CCP officials in Beijing (Dhussa, 2009, p. 1).
The resulting “agreement” signed between the two sides, even if Tibetan leadership had
no choice but to agree, formally allowed Tibet some degree of “autonomy” in its own affairs
(Davis, 2011, p. 33).1 However, after the signing of the “agreement,” Tibetans perceived CCP
officials of relenting on their portion of the “agreement” granting some degree of autonomy to
Tibet. The lack of Tibetan ability to govern and influence , as perceived by the Tibetans
culminated in large demonstration in 1959, which led the Dalai Lama—the spiritual and political
leader of Tibet—to flee to India and set up a government in exile in Dharamshala, India. Similar
large scale demonstrations took place in 1989 and 2008, the latter just prior to the Beijing
Summer Olympics.
The issues between Tibetan and Chinese officials are complex, even just those topics
confined to matters of sovereignty and autonomy. In analyzing tensions between Tibet and
China, nationalism comes into significant play. Geertz (1963) explains that nationalism
constitutes (or is a factor of) two competing factors: identity and civic; the commitments between
identity, or ethnic group, and civic, or a modern state, will lead to tensions, according to Geertz
(Hutchinson and Smith, 1994, p. 31). Chinese leaders’ policies have, somewhat ironically,

1

The Tibet Autonomous Region is one of five such bureaucratic designations within the PRC autonomous region
which has some degree of governance and input into policy areas such as education and language.
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strengthened the distinct identity of the Tibetan people in the face of authoritarian rule from
Beijing representatives. The Dalai Lama has been able to garner wide international support.
Unsurprisingly, additional international attention has lent legitimacy to the issues Tibetan
diaspora and domestic Tibetan populations identify with. As Deutsch (1966) describes,
nationalism, once it gains a certain threshold of power in the face of marginalization, does not
restrict a nation’s identifications to territory but can cross borders and identify with other
symbols (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994, p. 29). In the Tibetan case, this has been attained, best
displayed by an active international Tibetan diaspora committed to the issues in Tibet.
Similarly, the Chinese government has sought to extend economic incentives to the
Tibetan people. These initiatives, perceived as disingenuous beyond the security objectives of the
state, do not empower Tibetans to the authority level of decision making Beijing representatives
hold in Tibet (Davis, 2011, p. 33-34). The lack of economic progress has encouraged relief
programs, such as those promoted by the United National Development Programme, to bring
relief to ethnic Tibetans which do not currently share in the wealth found in the region but
currently enjoyed by other Chinese (UNDP, Tibet Development and Poverty Alleviation
Program). Slashing of Tibetan identity have made Tibetans second class citizens in their
historical territory (Amnesty International, China 2017/2018), laying bare the issues of
governance and ongoing tensions between many in the Tibetan community and Chinese officials
from Beijing.
Taiwan and Tibet are issues of great importance to the CCP. Both represent bases for
foreign influence and separatist activity which threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the CCP
as the sole legitimate protector of the Chinese people. Taiwan’s ambiguous international status
has not limited its capacity to maintain self-jurisdiction over its island. Tibet, on the other hand,
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is an internationally recognized province of the PRC. The CCP responds differently to both. In
the case of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, Tibet more closely resembles the difficulties and approaches
the CCP takes than Taiwan, in part due to the more limited influence the CCP has over the
island.
Beijing’s Perception of Separatists:
Leaders in Beijing view perceived seperatist actions in Tibet and Taiwan as threatening
for several synergistic reasons. The ”Century of Humiliation”: (~1839-1949) re-defined Chinese
statehood, identity and nationalism (Christensen, 2011 p. 61). Many of the nationalist principles
advocated by Xi Jinping draw on these issues, such as ‘The China Dream’. As seen from
Zhongnanhai, the predominant issues are the possibility that separatist activity will re-define
Chinese statehood. Within PRC borders and abroad, the CCP is also focused on the security
issues posed by foreign influence. Further, the internationalization of these issues has opened
border regions to malicious foreign influence in the eyes of Beijing. The synergy between these
problems could spark a pushback from the majority of the Chinese population who live outside
of the separatist regions in China (Weiss, 2014). It also, subsequently, would signal the failure of
the CCP as the sole, legitimate protector of the unitary image of the Chinese nation.
China’s experience with the “Century of Humiliation” has made modern leaders acutely
aware of China’s geographic vulnerability (Lieberthal, 2014). Nathan and Scobell (2012)
contend that the main driver in China’s foreign policy is “vulnerability to threats” (p. 1). One
potential way of viewing threat posed to the Chinese state is to see circles of risk to the state,
starting with domestic actors which can be influenced by border countries, such as India and
Japan as neighboring states that constitute the second ring (Nathan and Scobell, 2012, p. 1-2).
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Leaders in Beijing are concerned that minority populations in Tibet, for instance, may at times
have closer ties with outside powers. This is particularly true considering the Dalai Lama and his
international campaigns. From Beijing’s perspective, foreign powers are intervening in domestic
issues which subverts the sovereignty of China. For instance, Beijing held a perception that
cultural superiority of China outweighed the growing influence of the British over Chinese
tributary states through India (Nathan and Scobell, 2012 p. 20). As evidenced by loss of territory,
influence and collapse of the dynastic system, this perception was proven wrong shortly
thereafter.
Chinese leaders have sought to regain lost influence over border regions. The modern
CCP, especially under Xi Jinping, (General Secretary since 2012) has also made restoring China
to its rightful place of leadership in the world, not seen since the collapse of the dynastic system
a mission. (Ferdinand, 2016, p. 942-943). Taiwanese and Tibetan “agitators” acting
independently of Beijing’s influence opens, from Beijing’s perspective, the country up to foreign
influence and threatens to cause breakdown between the Chinese people and CCP. Being shaped
at the hands of outside powers, modern Chinese identity connects CCP legitimacy to the
territorial integrity of the Chinese state, especially Taiwan and Tibet. Any perceived loss of these
territories would re-open these severe wounds. As Weiss (2014) affirms, Chinese leaders know
they cannot in all cases control nationalist protests. With this in mind, the CCP is sensitive to any
movement which could open the country to foreign influence, break its territorial integrity or
deviate from the concept of China put forth by the CCP.
The 14th Dalai Lama has been in power since 1940, prior to the establishment of the PRC.
After demonstrations in Tibet starting in 1959, the Dalai Lama fled to Dharamsala, India where
he set up a government in exile. Since then, the Dalai Lama has been able to garner international
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attention for issues in Tibet, which from the perspective of the CCP, is inviting foreign powers to
intervene in Chinese domestic issues (Deepak, 2011, p. 316). Accordingly, the CCP has sought
to discourage foreign governments from meeting with the Dalai Lama.
III.

Replicating the “Dalai Lama Effect”

Introduction:
This section will seek to replicate the results of the “Dalai Lama Effect” by Fuchs and
Klann (2013) by using Sverdrup-Thygeson’s (2015) methodology. The first section will explore
the pros and cons of Sverdrup-Theygeon’s (2015) approach, as well as the potential downside(s)
to attributing drops in trade compared to the methodology used by Fuchs and Klann (2013).
Following this section, data will be collected from EuroStat and compared against only the
significant findings of Fuchs and Klann (2013). The scope will be limited to two countries that
the Dalai Lama visited frequently: Germany and Austria. The trade data analyzed will look at
sector data for machinery and transport between years 2002 and 2008, the sectors and years
found to be statistically significant by Fuchs and Klann (2013). Finally, the results will be
analyzed and compared to the original Fuchs and Klann (2013) findings to contextualize later
findings in analyzing the CCP’s response to Uyghur dissidents.

Sverdrup-Thygeson’s Methodology:
Sverdrup-Thygeson (2015) expands findings from the “Dalai Lama Effect” to test
whether or not China takes punitive measures against Norway after Liu Xiaobo received the
Nobel Peace Prize. To test this proposition, Sverdrup-Thygeson (2015) graphs Norwegian
exports to China approximately two years before and after Liu Xiaobo was named the recipient
of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 (p. 109-110). This data is graphed quarterly to show share of
24

market in total exports and is compared to other countries with a similar export composition,
including: Australia, Finland, Sweden, Germany and the European Union. Norwegian sector data
is graphed to highlight potential fluctuations. In isolating the drops across sectors, which turned
out to be limited to salmon exports, interviews were conducted with business executives and
government organizations to raise fidelity in analyzing fluctuations in trade as reflected in the
graphed data.
By graphing quarterly data as a portion of total trade, one can identify significant drops in
trade near the point of interest. Also, such an approach identifies and accounts for seasonal
fluctuations (p. 110). Any drops in trade can be correlated with other country fluctuations in
trade which may account for suspicious drops in trade or areas which need to be further
analyzed. Breaking trade data further down into sectors allows further analysis. To explain drops
in data, as done by Sverdrup-Thygeson (2015), interviews can raise confidence in the results.
One potential weakness of Sverdrup-Theygeson’s methodology is that it relies on
extensive fieldwork and interviews to increase or reduce confidence in differences in trade flows.
Replicability of methodology and results is difficult if the scope of the analysis is expanded to
larger countries and cross-country case studies due to geographic scope and number of
stakeholders. However, to substitute this portion of methodology one could identify time periods
of interest and drops in trade and code CCP rhetoric from state-fun Chinese newspapers to
capture CCP views by incorporating a rating schema this could raise the confidence in my
analysis of whether or not Chinese officials publicly messaged any potential repercussions to
hosting any dissident officials. Furthermore, Chinese newspapers would telegraph other
repercussions for the perceived offending state, including cancellation of trade negotiations,
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among other ongoing bilateral engagements, which falls below the threshold for economic
statecraft reducing imports into China.
Another weakness in this methodology is what appears to be the lack of statistical testing
for significance in trade drops. In many cases this may not be necessary. In the event that the
CCP publicly messages displeasure in a meeting, then probable repercussions can be assumed.
Such repercussions may be observed in comparing trade data from the country of interest against
other countries to account for macro-trade environment and seasonal fluctuations.
Rating Schema for Evaluating Rhetoric:
Due to the subjective nature of evaluating the rhetoric within newspapers, an author
produced rating schema has been created specifically to evaluate the rhetoric highlighted by in
the official English translations from Xinhua, the official “new China” news agency.2 A five
point coding system is included in the graph below. Negative two captures a very negative tone
from the CCP leaders of interest in relation to the event of interest or action of the other party to
benefit the CCP. Two captures positive language in relation to the event of interest (potential,
during, and post event) or action of the other party to benefit the CCP. Negative one has a less
severe negative tone than negative two, just as one has a less positive tone than positive two. A
neutral tone is included, but is unlikely to appear in statements from CCP leaders or the Foreign
Ministry in Xinhua because a response would not likely be deemed necessary. But, for holistic
analysis, a score is included for neutral tone on Dalai Lama visits abroad.

2

The rating schema for evaluating rhetoric has been influenced by the work of Berganza Conde, Arcila Calderón,
and Miguel Pascual in their work “Negativity in the Political News in the Spanish News Media.
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Table 2.1: Author Created Rating Schema for Evaluating Rhetoric
Tone

Score

Examples of Adjectives

Example

Very Negative

-2

Stern, serious, unforgiving, sliding

Japan faces stern consequences
if the Dalai Lama visits.

Negative

-1

Concerned, worried, uneasy

China is concerned about
reports of the Dalai Lama
visiting Japan.

Neutral

0

Not concerned, not worried,

China is not concerned with
the prospect of the Dalai
Lama’s visit to India.

Positive

1

Friendly, open, pleasant

China would like to thank the
Dalai Lama for his friendly
gesture towards China.

Very Positive

2

Great, prominent, considerable

China’s great ties with the
Dalai Lama are significant.

27

Each instance of the term in relation to the event will be assigned a score. Statements will
be analyzed prior to an event, during, and after to capture any changes in the severity of rhetoric
from Chinese leaders. These scores will be added up and divided by number of observations to
assign a tone score for that event. The events of interest, shown below, will be researched using
the LexisNexis database.
Replicating Trade Analysis:
Two graphs display Germany and Austria’s quarterly trade, graphed approximately two
years before and after the Dalai Lama met with political leaders and government members
between the years 2002-2008. The countries Sverdrup-Thygeson (2015) used as a control
variable to compare Norway to will not be used because the Dalai Lama visited these countries.
In their place, countries were selected for similar export composition, size, and lack of extensive
Dalai Lama visits. The Republic of Korea and Singapore will be graphed against Germany, both
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countries were selected for similar export composition and size. Austria will be graphed
alongside Sweden and Switzerland to potentially account for drops in trade.
Figure 2.1: Exports to China from Germany, Republic of Korea, and Singapore

Note: This figure shows exports to China from Germany, Republic of Korea, and Singapore from
quarter 1 in 2001 to quarter 1 in 2010. The data is taken from IMF’s Directions of Trade
Statistics. Note: Vertical lines indicate meetings with a government member (black line) or
political leader (light gray line), data taken from DalaiLama.com.
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Figure 2.2: Exports to China from Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland

Note: This figure shows exports to China from Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland from quarter 1
in 2001 until quarter 1 in 2010. The data is taken from IMF’s Directions of Trade Statistics.
Note: Vertical lines indicate meetings with a government member (black line) or political leader
(light gray line), data taken from DalaiLama.com.
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Sector Data:
As per Sverdrup-Thygeson’s (2015) methodology, the sectors which were deemed most
at risk to CCP retaliation are machinery and transport equipment. In Sverdrup-Thygeson’s
(2015) work official trade data from the Norwegian government is used, to maintain equivalent
reporting on trade statistics, data from the EuroStat will be used. Sverdrup-Thygeson used the
Standard International Trade Classification product group ‘Machinery and transport equipment’,
due to the classification used by EuroStat, the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) will be
utilized. Two product groups will be combined to account for the STIC product group
‘Machinery and transport equipment’, to include: ‘Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear
reactors, boilers; parts thereof’ and ‘Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and
parts and accessories thereof.’
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Figure 2.3: China’s Market Share of German HTS Groups (HTS 84 and 87)
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Note: This figure shows the China’s market share in German exports of the HTS 84 and 87
category. The data is taken from Eurostat.

Figure 2.4: China’s Market Share of Austrian HTS Groups (HTS 84 and 87)
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Note: This figure shows the China’s market share in Austrian exports of the HTS 84 and 87
category. The data is taken from Eurostat.
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Dalai Lama Visits & Analysis Methodology
To determine if any CCP retaliation occurred, German exports of the HTS 84 and 87
group will displayed for a period of approximately two years after the visit, including the month
during which the meeting took place. The rating scale discussed earlier will be utilized to rate
rhetoric from CCP officials. Both sets of data will then be analyzed to determine to what extent,
if any, CCP actions may have occurred against these German sectors. For the sources to judge
rhetoric, I used: Xinhua General News Service, Xinhua Financial News, Xinhua Economic News
Service, and Xinhua News. For key words, Dalai Lama and the country were used for the
timeframe of interest. Observations will be reported following the graph of each event, but all
events from Germany and Austria, will be analyzed in a concluding section.
Dalai Lama Meetings with German Officials
The first visit within the timeframe of interest, 2002-2008, occurred on May 30, 2003
between the Dalai Lama and German government representatives. In Berlin, the Dalai Lama met
with Joschka Fisher, Foreign Minister of Germany, Wolfgang Thierse, President of the German
Parliament, and Claudia Roth, Commissioner of Human Rights. These visits coincided with a
wider number of visits between the Dalai Lama and European officials of other countries.
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Figure 2.5: China’s Market Share of HTS Groups (period one)
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Note: This figure shows the China’s market share in German exports of the HTS 84 and 87
category. The data is taken from Eurostat.
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Following the Dalai Lama’s visits with German officials, the trade data in figure 2.5 does
not show a rapid decline in exports from Germany to China. However, a noticeable drop does
take place less than three months after the trip. To examine and to potentially corroborate
whether the drop in trade is due to CCP economic statecraft, Xinhua was searched and analyzed
to see whether or not any statements were made. LexisNexis was used from a timeframe of May
01, 2003 through July 01, 2003 with the search terms used. The search results did not yield any
statements from CCP officials or Foreign Ministry. This result was unexpected, but will be
further analyzed in the following section.
The second visit of interest took place in Berlin June 18-19, 2005 between the Dalai
Lama and Wolfgang Thierse, the President of the German Parliament and Angela Merkel,
Leader of the German CDU/CSU Party who would later that year become the German
Chancellor.
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Figure 2.6: China’s Market Share of HTS Groups (period two)
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Note: This figure shows the China’s market share in German exports of the HTS 84 and 87
category. The data is taken from Eurostat.
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Figure 2.6 shows a trade pattern similar to 2.5, trade remains high during the month of
the visit and drops within three months. However, this may be an issue of conflating the visit
with trends in trade during the summer months. As seen in figure 2.5 and 2.6, trade visibly
declines in the July-August months, this trend will further be analyzed in the following time
frames of interest. Further complicating any rhetoric corroboration is the lack of statements
evidence in a LexisNexis search on Xinhua from June 01, 2005 through August 01, 2005 with
the search terms used.
The third visit took place September 23, 2007 in Berlin between the Dalai Lama and
Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany. The Dalai Lama also met with provincial level leaders
September 22-22, 2007, including: Roland Koch, Minister President of Hessen and Jurgen
Ruettgers, Minister President of North Rhine-Westphalia. The fourth visit occurred May 15-19,
2008 in Berlin, between the Dalai Lama and Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, Federal Minister for
Economic Cooperation & Development of Germany and Norbert Lammert, Speaker of the
German Parliament. On May 15, 2008 the Dalai Lama also met with Roland Koch, Minister
President of Hessen, a provincial level leader. The figure below shows visits three and four due
to the fourth falling within the two year examination period after the third visit.
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Figure 2.7: China’s Market Share of HTS Groups (period three & four)
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Note: This figure shows the China’s market share in German exports of the HTS 84 and 87
category. The data is taken from Eurostat.
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Both time frames were evaluated independently to judge for the potential of rhetoric from
Chinese officials. LexisNexis was used from a timeframe of September 01, 2007 through
November 1, 2007 (table 2.2) for the first of the two time frames, and then for the second starting
May 01, 2008 through July 01, 2008 (table 2.3) with the search terms used.
Table 2.2: Author Created Rating Schema for Evaluating Rhetoric: Dalai Lama Visits,
2007
Tone

Score

Examples of Adjectives

Instances

Very Negative

-2

Stern, serious, unforgiving, rude,
strongly

7: September 23, 2007

Negative

-1

Concerned, worried, uneasy,
negative

1: September 18, 2007
1: September 23, 2007

Neutral

0

Not concerned, not worried,

0

Positive

1

Friendly, open, pleasant

0

Very Positive

2

Great, prominent, considerable

0
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Prior to the start of the visit, September 18, 2007, the Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokesperson warned against contact between the Dalai Lama and German officials, explicitly
stating China was “firmly against” any contact between the two parties (BBC Monitoring Asia
Pacific, 2007, p. 1). The Foreign Ministry spokesperson on September 25 reiterated how China
was “strongly dissatisfied” with the meeting between Chancellor Merkel and the Dalai Lama
(BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2007, p. 1). This represents sharp increase in rhetoric from the
Foreign Ministry is documented after the visit between Chancellor Merkel and the Dalai Lama
took place. The end score leading up and during the meeting is -1.8, indicating a high degree of
negativity. Following the meeting the Foreign Ministry did not comment for the time period of
interest. However, several articles were published by authors which reiterated the CCP’s deep
dissatisfaction of foreign states accepting the “separatist” Dalai Lama.
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Table 2.3: Author Created Rating Schema for Evaluating Rhetoric: Dalai Lama’s visits,
2008
Tone

Score

Examples of Adjectives

Instances

Very Negative

-2

Stern, serious, unforgiving, rude,
strongly

1: May 20, 2008

Negative

-1

Concerned, worried, uneasy,
negative

0

Neutral

0

Not concerned, not worried,

0

Positive

1

Friendly, open, pleasant

0

Very Positive

2

Great, prominent, considerable

0
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The Foreign Ministry reiterated the importance of Sino-German relations and the CCP’s
stance of “strongly” being against allowing the Dalai Lama to use any platform for separatist
activities (“China Urges Germany not...”, Xinhua General News Service, 2008) Although only
one reference to the Dalai Lama meeting with German officials was found by the Foreign
Ministry in Xinhua the timeframe of interest did show other statements outside of the purview of
this study. For instance, China and Germany moved to resume strategic dialogue on issues such
as human rights (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2008). There were comments found in Xinhua on
the potential for dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama (Gulf Daily News, 2008). This
progress also coincided with the refusal of many German officials to meet the Dalai Lama,
including the German President Horst Koehler (“German minister meets Dalai…”, Xinhua
General News Service, 2008, p. 1).
Dalai Lama Meetings with Austrian Officials
The first visit within the timeframe of interest, 2002-2008, occurred on October 13, 2002
between the Dalai Lama and Austrian officials. In Graz, the Dalai Lama met with Benita
Ferrero-Waldner, Foreign Minister of Austria.
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Figure 2.8: China’s Market Share of HTS Groups (period one)
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Note: This figure shows the China’s market share in Austrian exports of the HTS 84 and 87
category. The data is taken from Eurostat.
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Following the visit in October 13, 2002, figure 2.8 shows a slight increase in portion of
Austria’s trade with China before steeply dropping three months after the visits. To corroborate
any potential repercussion from warnings, LexisNexis was searched from October 1, 2002
through December 1, 2002 with key words: Dalai Lama and Austria. The search did not yield
any results.
The second timeframe of interest occurred between May 13-30, 2006. On May 14, the
Dalai Lama met Hubert Gorbach, Vice Chancellor of Austria, Maria Rauch-Kallat, Minister of
Health of Austria, Karin Gastinger, Minister of Justice. In addition, the Dalai Lama also met with
the Governor of Carinthia, Jörg Haider. Later that month, on May 30, 2006, the Dalai Lama met
with Wolfang Schussel, the Chancellor of Austria and President of the European Council.
The third time period of interest took place betweenSeptember 17-20, 2007. The Dalai
Lama again met with Jörg Haider. Also, the Dalai Lama met with Alfred Gusenberger,
Chancellor of Austria and Erwin Proll, Governor of Lower Austria. Due to the overlap in visits,
figure 2.9 displays from the second timeframe of interest in May 2006 until two years after the
third timeframe of interest.
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Figure 2.9: China’s Market Share of HTS Groups (period two & three)
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Note: This figure shows the China’s market share in German exports of the HTS 84 and 87
category. The data is taken from Eurostat.
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LexisNexis was searched from September 1, 2007 through November 1, 2007 with the
key words: Dalai Lama and Austria. The search did not yield any results. This is unsurprising
because a high level meeting between President Bush of the United States and the Dalai Lama
took place in October, 2007.
Following the visit between the Dalai Lama and Austria officials in May 2006, figure 2.9
shows an increase in trade immediately following the event with a sharp decline three months
after the meeting. Trade remained below peak observed in figure 2.9 until August 2007.
LexisNexis was searched from May 1, 2006 through July 1, 2006 with key words. The search did
not yield any results.
Analysis:
Figure 2.5 and 2.6 show an increase in trade during the month of the visits but a visible
drop within three months. In both instances, exports to China, as a percentage of all trade, does
not climb to the peaks observed within the three months following the visit until at least a year,
as shown in 2.6, and two years in 2.5. An examination of figure 2.1 does not show a drop in trade
from the Republic of Korea or Singapore. Furthermore, the timeframe of interest shown in figure
2.5 and 2.6, summer months, does not show a similar drop in the years proceeding or following
these visits in figure 2.3. Although rhetoric from CCP officials is not correlated with these visits,
these drops standout from the same time of year of other years and the length of time of drop.
Although a significant drop in trade is not observed in figure 2.7 for the third visit, a
decrease is observed after the fourth visit within a three month timeframe. The fourth visit took
place during the summer, though; the proceeding and following year during the summer months
do not show a decline in trade. Following the drop in trade after the third visit, market share did
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not recover for four months. Visible drops during the summer months, as seen in figure 2.3,
occur during the first, second, and fourth visit. Rhetoric from CCP officials was not observed
during the first and second visits but only during the third and fourth.
The month of the visit showed a continuing decline in trade (figure 2.8) but rose and then
fell within three months of the visit. Market share did not rebound within the two year timeframe
of interest. Likewise, the second visit showed a drop in trade nearly exactly at the three month
mark. Trade levels did not rebound for approximately a year from the initial drop.
During the third timeframe of interest, September 2007, figure 2.9 shows there was a
decline in trade during September which continued for only a month before trade grew for two
months before dropping off and not rebounding above the peak until October 2007.
The small sample size reduces confidence in the results, but a pattern is emerging
irrespective of the control countries (figure 2.3 and 2.4) and seasonal trade patterns where trade
drops in all instances but one within three months. The exact time that trade remains below the
previous peak does not appear to have a pattern. These results may be significant but are difficult
to correlate with CCP rhetoric, largely due to the lack of instances of public messaging. The
decreases in trade are readily identifiable in graphs above but lack the statistical significance
found in Fuchs and Klann (2013) work. Any future work on CCP economic statecraft using the
method above will need to caveat the weaker results than statistical analysis in potentially
correlating CCP retaliation against states which host dissident figures.
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Chapter Three: Chinese Responses to Uyghur Activist and Trade Analysis
I.

Introduction:
This chapter examines the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) relationship with Uyghur

dissidents abroad and in Xinjiang, China. It looks at recent and historical reasons for separatist
movements in Xinjiang, development of a separate identity, key Uyghur agitators, and CCP
responses. In examining the CCP’s willingness to respond, Sverdrup-Thygeson’s (2015)
methodology and an author created rhetoric rating schema will be applied to prominent Uyghur
events in Germany and Turkey to examine to what extent, if any, the CCP responds.
II.

Perceived Separatist Challenges to the CCP

Xinjiang: Background & Challenges:
Xinjiang’s history with China’s dynastic system shifted back and forth as dynastic reach
waxed and waned. The current tensions displayed between the Uyghur people in Xinjiang and
the CCP draws on issues of self-governance and autonomy. Each party points to different
interests in why they take the actions they do. The Uyghur population often points to CCP
religious intolerance and intervention in the region as a main motive in pursuit of their goals, for
some, a separate state. The CCP, on the other hand, is wary of the Muslim majority region given
unrest that dates back decades and even into the previous century with Muslim rebellions in
present day Xinjiang.
The region of Xinjiang played a specific role in buffering against foreign powers
beginning in the 1750’s; Xinjiang was later incorporated as a province in 1884 (Van Wie Davis,
2008, p. 16). During this period, after 1884, the people occupying the region did not refer to
themselves as a collective people, instead they identified with their town (Roberts, 2009, p. 363;
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Thum, 2012, p. 628). As Roberts argues (2009), encounters with the Russian Empire and Qing
Dynasty in the late 1800’s strengthened and unified the political unity of the Uyghur people (p.
365). Distress in the face of perceived colonial action and educational movement based on
religious, language, and historical factors began to lead to the collective identity of the modern
Uyghur people (Roberts, 2009, p. 366-367).
The beginning of the 20th Century saw the collective identity of a ‘Uyghur’ people begin
to take shape. It was recognized within the Soviet Union as the Communists began to delineate
different people groups (Roberts, 2009, p. 370). The 1920’s saw the standardization of a single
language and books were printed in local vernacular (Roberts, 2009, p. 371). As Anderson
describes of the European experience with early nationalism, print and the distribution of written
materials in local vernacular greatly expanded the bond between people who spoke the same
language but did not formerly see themselves as a larger group, or nation (Hutchinson and Smith,
1994, p. 95). Intellectuals in the region, particularly in the Soviet Union, pushed to create a
‘Uyghur nation’ within the Soviet Union, although their political efforts did not materialize they
were successful in cultivating a strengthened Uyghur identity (Roberts, 2009, p. 374-375).
The establishment of the PRC and the CCP’s policies in Xinjiang led to heightened
tensions. With the Anti-Rightist policy (1957) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the
Uyghur people saw mosques burned and cultural traditions suppressed, including local language
(Van Wie Davis, 2008, p. 17). The relative loosening of the late 1970’s and 1980’s allowed for
greater Uyghur activism for what was perceived as lack of economic opportunity (Van Wie
Davis, 2008, p. 17). The liberalization experience in Xinjiang was accompanied by Uyghurs
calling for greater autonomy as the state pursued a strategy to expand economic opportunity in
the region and Central Asia alongside improved security conditions (Clarke, 2011, p. 128). The
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CCP perspective was that economic growth, as was successful in other parts of China, would
repress political calls for policy. Instead, state led modernization has in fact led to the
strengthening of identities (Clarke, 2011, p. 128-129). State modernization efforts have been
unsuccessful from the perspective of the CCP and have in fact led to hardening of Uyghur
identities as local Uyghurs have been displaced alongside a large influx of Han Chinese (Clarke,
2011, p. 129). There is a fear among many local Uyghurs that they are being “diluted” by the
Han majority, best associated with the CCP (Clarke, 2011, p. 129).
However, the relaxation observed in the 1970’s and 1980’s was short lived as a clamp
down occurred in the 1990’s as CCP newspapers regularly reported on “terrorist” activity on
Xinjiang (Shichor, 2005, p. 121). Tensions further heightened in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on
the United States. In particular, the CCP launched a campaign to reign in “illegal activities” and
discourage women from following local Uyghur customs (Clarke, 2011, p. 129).
Beijing’s Perception of Separatists:
The issues in Xinjiang are increasingly viewed as separatist and worrisome to CCP
leaders for several synergistic reasons. As noted in the previous chapter, the “Century of
Humiliation” (~1839-1949) re-defined Chinese statehood, identity and nationalism (Christensen,
2011 p. 61). Leaders, such as Xi Jinping, are acutely aware of the failures of the Soviet Union in
maintaining its own identity and connection with its institutions. Such failure is undoubtedly on
the minds of many leaders are they deal with nationalistic pressures, and with the
internationalization of Uyghur separatism and hardening of identities. These worries are
compounded as the CCP has promoted the thought that the single power able to protect the
Chinese people and help move away from this previous shame is the CCP. By accepting this
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position, the CCP has pushed itself into a positon whereby the failure to hold the Chinese state
together could result in great pushback from the majority of Chinese living outside of Xinjiang
(Weiss, 2014).
Similar to the issues found with Tibet, China’s leaders are aware of the geographic
vulnerability on its periphery (Lieberthal, 2014). China’s foreign policy responds to these threats
in mind (Nathan and Scobell, 2012, p. 1). In particular, the geographic spread, language, and
religious make-up of the Uyghur people in Xinjiang pose a daunting challenge to CCP.
Following 9/11, the CCP sought to connect separatist Uyghur activity to international terrorism
(Clarke, 2012, p. 132). The CCP has been successful in getting other countries, such as the
United Kingdom, to list certain organizations, like the East Turkistan Islamic Party, as terrorist
organizations. Prior to these attacks, the CCP had taken multilateral approaches to pursuing its
economic, anti-separatist, and border interests in the region through setting up the Shanghai-5,
later succeeded by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 3(Clarke, 2012, p. 136-137).
Following the attacks of 9/11, China has sought to extend its influence in Central Asia,
particularly as the United States (Clarke, 2012, p. 137). The interest of the CCP to enlarge
influence for political and economic interests are unquestionably tied to the CCP legitimation of
continued economic growth and territorial integrity.
The CCP has dealt with several key Uyghur activists from 2000-2008. The World
Uyghur Congress (WUC) is of particular concern to the CCP due to the consolidation of multiple
organizations which sought to bring light to the issues perceived important to Uyghur dissidents.

3

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a multi-governmental organization which combats and discusses
several issues. One principle issue the combatting the “three evils” which are: separatism, terrorism, and
extremism.
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Specifically, the WUC was founded after the merger of the East Turkestan National Congress
and the World Uyghur Youth Congress on April 16, 2004 (WUC, 2018, p. 3). The WUC is
concerned and opposed to, as some Uyghur dissidents view it, the Chinese occupation of Uyghur
lands, commonly known as East Turkestan (WUC, 2018, p. 3). This organizations consolidated
and unified Uyghur dissident voices, thus making it a more visible organization.
Rebiya Kadeer, in particular, has brought light to the issues Uyghurs face in China and
abroad. In the 1990’s she brought CCP attention to development issues by founding initiatives.
In 1997 she was invited to speak before the National People’s Congress in Beijing (China’s
National Legislature) to deliver a pre-approved speech, but she delivered a different speech
which was critical of the CCP and their practices in Xinjiang. During this time she received
pressure from the CCP which resulted in her arrest in 1999 for, according to the CCP, stealing
state secrets ( “Rebiya Kadeer” World Uyghur Congress). Following her release in 2006, she
accepted a position as the head of the WUC and has sought to bring international attention to the
perceived issues faced by the Uyghur people.
III.

Applying Sverdrup-Thygeson’s Methodology to Uyghur Case Study

Sverdrup-Thygeson’s methodology:
Sverdrup-Theygeson (2015) used a methodology to test whether or not China takes
punitive measures against Norway after Liu Xiaobo received the Nobel Peace Prize. SverdrupTheygeson graphs quarterly Norwegian exports to China for approximately two years prior and
after the granting of Liu Xiaobo the Nobel Peace Prize (p 109, 110). Other countries are used as
a counterbalance to see whether trade drops can be correlated to CCP actions or larger macroeconomic trade trends. For instance, the author uses countries with a similar trade composition
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including Australia, Finland, Sweden, Germany, and the European Union. Fluctuations in
exports were narrowed and then corroborated by government and business officials.
Rating Schema:
Due to the subjective nature of evaluating the rhetoric within newspapers, an author
produced rating schema is used to evaluate CCP rhetoric in the official English translations from
Xinhua, the official “new China” news agency. 4 A five point coding system is included in the
graph below. Negative two captures a very negative tone from the CCP leaders of interest in
relation to the event of interest or action of the other party to benefit the CCP. Two captures
positive language in relation to the event of interest (potential, during, and post event) or action
of the other party to benefit the CCP. Negative one has a less severe negative tone than negative
two, just as one has a less positive tone than positive two. A neutral tone is included, but is
unlikely to appear in statements from CCP leaders or the Foreign Ministry in Xinhua because a
response would not likely be deemed necessary. But, for holistic analysis, a score is included for
neutral tone on Rebiya Kadeer visits abroad.

4

The rating schema for evaluating rhetoric has been influenced by the work of Berganza Conde, Arcila Calderón,
and Miguel Pascual in their work “Negativity in the Political News in the Spanish News Media.
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Table 3.1: Author Created Rating Schema for Evaluating Rhetoric, Uyghur Activists
Tone

Score

Examples of Adjectives

Example

Very Negative

-2

Stern, serious, unforgiving, sliding

Japan faces stern consequences
if Rebiya Kadeer visits.

Negative

-1

Concerned, worried, uneasy

China is concerned about
reports of the Rebiya Kadeer
visiting Japan.

Neutral

0

Not concerned, not worried,

China is not concerned with
the prospect of Rebiya
Kadeer’s visit to India.

Positive

1

Friendly, open, pleasant

China would like to thank
Rebiya Kadeer for his friendly
gesture towards China.

Very Positive

2

Great, prominent, considerable

China’s great ties with Rebiya
Kadeer are significant.
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Each instance of the term in relation to the event will be assigned a score. Statements will
be analyzed prior to an event, during, and after to capture any changes in the severity of rhetoric
from Chinese leaders. These scores will be added up and divided by number of observations to
assign a tone score for that event. The events of interest, shown below, will be researched using
the LexisNexis database.
Case selection & Trade:
Two countries were selected to identify potential decreases in trade, Germany and
Turkey. Two graphs display countries’ quarterly trade, graphed approximately two years before
and after Uyghur events of interest between the years 2002-2008. Germany will be graphed
against export data from Australia and the United States. Both countries were selected due to
similar export compositions to Germany’s and to account for changes in the macroeconomic
environment. Turkey will be graphed against the Czech Republic and Myanmar to account for
worldwide economic shifts in trade.
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Figure 3.1: Exports to China from Germany, Australia, and the United States

Note: This figure shows exports to China from Australia, Germany, and the United States from
quarter 1 in 2001 to quarter 1 in 2010. The data is taken from IMF’s Directions of Trade
Statistics. Note: Vertical lines indicate meetings with a government members/political leaders
(black line) or other Uyghur activities (light gray line), data taken from Schichor (2013) high
level Uyghur dissident activities in Germany (p. 619).
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Figure 3.2: Exports to China from Turkey, Czech Republic, and Myanmar

Note: This figure shows exports to China from Turkey, Czech Republic, and Myanmar from
quarter 1 in 2001 to quarter 1 in 2010. The data is taken from IMF’s Directions of Trade
Statistics. Note: Vertical light gray line indicates Uyghur activities, data taken from Schichor
(2009) high level Uyghur dissident activities in Turkey (p. 49-50).
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As per Sverdrup-Thygeson’s (2015) methodology, the sectors which were deemed most
at risk to CCP retaliation are machinery and transport equipment. In Sverdrup-Thygeson’s
(2015) work official trade data from the Norwegian government is used, to maintain equivalent
reporting on trade statistics, data from the EuroStat will be used. Sverdrup-Thygeson used the
Standard International Trade Classification product group ‘Machinery and transport equipment’,
due to the classification used by EuroStat, the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) will be
utilized. Two product groups will be combined to account for the STIC product group
‘Machinery and transport equipment’, to include: ‘Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear
reactors, boilers; parts thereof’ and ‘Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and
parts and accessories thereof.’
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Figure 3.3: China’s Market Share of German HTS Groups (HTS 84 and 87)
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Note: This figure shows the China’s market share in German exports of the HTS 84 and 87
category. The data is taken from Eurostat.

Figure 3.4: China’s Market Share of Turkish HTS Groups (HTS 84 and 87)
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Note: This figure shows the China’s market share in Turkish exports of the HTS 84 and 87
category. The data is taken from TurkStat.
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Uyghur Dissident Visits & Analysis:
To determine if any CCP retaliation occurred, German and Turkish exports of the HTS
84 and 87 group will displayed for a period of approximately two years after the visit, including
the month during which the meeting took place. The rating scale discussed earlier will be utilized
to rate rhetoric from CCP officials. Both data will then be analyzed to determine to what extent,
if any, CCP retaliation may have occurred against these sectors. For the sources to judge rhetoric
on, I used: Xinhua General News Service, Xinhua Financial News, Xinhua Economic News
Service, and Xinhua News. For key words, the country of interest (Turkey or Germany) and
China were used for the timeframe of interest. Terms searched included: Rebiya Kadeer
(including other spellings of her name), Uyghur, Uighur, and World Uyghur Congress, and
Foreign Ministry. Observations will be reported following the graph of each event, but all events,
Germany and Turkey, will be analyzed in the concluding section.
Uyghur Visits with German Officials:
The first time period of interest took place November 21-23, 2006. Rebiya Kadeer visited
Germany from the United States as the second ever WUC General Assembly was hosted in
Munich, Germany. During her visit, she met with several members of Parliament, as noted by
Schichor (2013), primarily the Green Party, which was an opposition party at the time. During
this brief visit, Kadeer also received in excess of 50 congratulatory letters, including one from
Chancellor Angela Merkel and government ministers (p. 619). Shortly following this visit,
Uyghur issues were raised in German Parliament of the treatment of the human rights issues in
China. Among the issues raised, Parliament pushed the German Foreign Ministry to intervene on
behalf of Kadeer on the Chinese imprisonment of her son (p. 619).
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Figure 3.5: China’s Market Share of HTS Groups (period one)
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Note: This figure shows the China’s market share in German exports of the HTS 84 and 87
category. The data is taken from Eurostat.
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As seen in Figure 3.5, trade does fall within two months of the WUC and German
government representatives meeting with Rebiya Kadeer and drawing attention to the WUC.
Trade does not rebound to pre-visit levels for approximately six months. Although, the drop in
trade during this time period corresponds with similar declines in trade between China and
Australia and the United States (see Figure 3.1). To examine and to potentially corroborate the
drop in trade is due to CCP economic statecraft, Xinhua was searched and analyzed to see
whether or not any statements were made. LexisNexis was used from a timeframe of November
01, 2006 through January 01, 2007 with key words: Germany and China. Due to large number of
results for the time period of interest, further search terms were used to narrow down the results:
Rebiya Kadeer, Uyghur, Uighur, and World Uyghur Congress, and Foreign Ministry. The search
results did not yield any statements from CCP officials or Foreign Ministry.
The second time period of interest took place April 21-23, 2008. This was a Uyghur
leadership training event. Although no explicit meetings took place between Uyghur dissidents
and German leaders, it drew attention to the plight of Uyghurs and also brought together several
activists.
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Figure 3.6: China’s Market Share of HTS Groups (period two)
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Note: This figure shows the China’s market share in German exports of the HTS 84 and 87
category. The data is taken from Eurostat.
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Figure 3.6 does show a sustained drop from three months after the time period of interest.
Searching the terms during this timeframe of interest did not return any results. In part, as will be
more fully explored in Chapter 4, the CCP was likely focused on the attention the Dalai Lama
was drawing to issues in Tibet up until the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The small drop in trade
between July and October, when trade rebounded, appears to be within visible norms of seasonal
trade, as seen in figure 3.3.
Uyghur Visits with Turkish Officials:
As previously described, Uyghur activism has waned since the 1990’s. In part, this is due
to Turkish government pressure, but also due to relocation of dissidents to other countries, such
as Germany and Turkey. Due to the direct interactions between government officials and
politicians and Uyghur dissidents in Turkey, large Uyghur demonstrations and positive
overtures, from the perspective of the CCP, will be examined. Due to the small number of
instances to analyze, the scope will example based on examples Schichor (2009) documents.
Each time period of interest is further analyzed against potential statements from CCP officials.
Using LexisNexis database, index terms Turkey and China were searched. Due to the large
number of results for the time period of interest, further search terms were used to narrow down
the results: Rebiya Kadeer, Uyghur, Uighur, and World Uyghur Congress, and Foreign Ministry.
The first timeframe of interests took place June 12, 2003. A large gathering of over 1,500
people commemorated the anniversary of Uyghur’s arrival in Turkey, even against the Chinese
government protestations (Schichor, 2009, p. 49). The second time period of interest occurred in
September 2004. As Schichor (2009) describes, Ismail Cengiz, then Chairman of the East
Turkestan Solidarity Association in Turkey, contacted multiple media outlets in Turkey to draw
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attention to Uyghur plight (p. 49). In response, the Chinese asked the Turkish government for an
explanation which was met with noninterference from the Turkish government (p. 49).
Figure 3.7: China’s Market Share of HTS Groups (period one & two)
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1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4

0.2
0
Jun. Aug. Oct. Dec. Feb. Apr. Jun. Aug. Oct. Dec. Feb. Apr. Jun. Aug. Oct. Dec. Feb. Apr. Jun. Aug.
2003 2003 2003 2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006 2006 2006

Note: This figure shows the China’s market share in Turkish exports of the HTS 84 and 87
category. The data is taken from TurkStat.
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Figure 3.7 shows a decline in Turkish exports to China immediately following the time
period of interest. However, a sudden spike is observed in both figure 3.7 and overall export
trade from Turkey to China in figure 3.2. During the second time period of interest, exports to
China continued to decline for up to a period of five months before rising but not to the extent
seen just after the first time period of interest. LexisNexis was searched, as noted the above
instances, to observe whether or not CCP officials made any remarks in regards to what was
observed. The first search included June 01, 2003 until August 01, 2003. Using the same search
terms, the second time period was searched from September 01, 2004 until November 01, 2004.
Both search times did not yield any results.
A third time period of interest took place April 3, 2008. A large number of Uyghurs and
Turks demonstrated against the 2008 Beijing Olympics in Istanbul, Turkey.
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Figure 3.8: China’s Market Share of HTS Groups (period three)
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Note: This figure shows the China’s market share in Turkish exports of the HTS 84 and 87
category. The data is taken from TurkStat.
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Following the event of interest in April, 2008, no clear discernable pattern in observed in
figure 3.8 As will be explored analysis in Chapter 4, it is likely the CCP’s attention was focused
on the greater attention the Dalai Lama was bringing to separatist issues in China than Uyghur
dissidents were. But, to examine whether or not CCP officials made any statements, the dates
April 01, 2008 until June 01, 2008 were searched using the key words noted above. The results
did not return any statements from CCP officials but there was increasing discussion of the
perceived Uyghur plight in Xinjiang, China which was not observed in the two previous time
periods of interest.
Analysis:
Figure 3.5 shows that after WUC and German government representatives interacting
with Rebiya Kadeer and supporting the issues put forth by the WUC, trade dropped within two
months. This drop in trade is different than the one observed in figure 3.6. In the second time
period of interest for German exports to China, trade within two months does not drop but takes
an additional month before decreasing and then returning to pre-visit levels in five months. The
sustainment of the decrease is similar to that observed in Figure 3.5 which dropped and did not
rebound for six months. However, the decrease in Figure 3.5 is less severe than that observed in
Figure 3.6. The sustainment in drop cannot be correlated with seasonal fluctuations due to the
different time of year for both time periods. But, in both instances, it appears in the macroenvironment trade flows declined, as seen in Figure 3.1.
Although a pattern is not discernable in figure 3.8, figure 3.7 shows fluctuations in trade.
Figure 3.7 shows a sharp decline in Turkish exports to China before quickly rebounding to
higher levels. This spike is corroborated across all trade sectors which is not reflected in the
control countries, as seen in figure 3.2. Similarly, in the second time period of interest in figure
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3.7, exports declined for approximately five months before rebounding. This decline may
correlate with seasonality trends, however, the trend is only observed between 2001 and 2005,
after which the trend reverses.
A pattern may be observed in the two time periods of interest in the German case,
however, it is difficult to correlate. There is a lack of CCP statement corroborating information.
However, several high interest events may account for fluctuations in trade. Additionally, many
CCP actions potentially taken against Germany and Turkey may fall below the threshold for
economic statement. Other actions and punitive measures put in place will be more fully
examined in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4: Economic Statecraft and Analysis
I.

Introduction
The central question of this study investigates how authoritarian states prioritize between

economic growth and territorial integrity. The case study of China’s response to Uyghur
dissidents’ international activism in Germany and Turkey was selected. These countries were
selected due to large Uyghur activist movements and important trade links with China. Scholarly
works have established that China responds economically and diplomatically to other countries
which threaten its core interests. This study examined to what extent the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) responds to these challenges, and in what manner.
In influencing consumer behavior, Ettenson, Klein, and Morris (1998) find that military,
economic, and political tensions affect how consumers buy a product based off of its country of
origin (p. 90). Although the extent to which the CCP influences consumers’ behavior remain
unclear. The previous model (Etterson, Klein, and Morris, 1998) corroborates Wu’s (2009) work,
who argues that China uses multi-issue bargaining and pressure to exert influence on transnational companies. Likewise, diplomatically and economically pressuring countries in response
to perceived misgivings fits into Wu’s (2009) findings. He finds that China is better suited than
many democratic states to twist other countries to its interests. In part, Wu (2009) finds China’s
increased leverage over other countries because of the West’s dependence on China for
additional economic growth.
Fuchs and Klann (2013) analyze whether or not threats are carried out against other
governments when the Dalai Lama visits other countries, especially as dependence on China’s
economic ties continues to grow. Trade data from China and countries which the Dalai Lama
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visited from a period of 1991-2008 were examined. Statistical findings show that heads of state
receiving the Dalai Lama were faced with economic punishment from China, which usually
subsides after a period of two years (Fuchs and Klann, 2013, p. 175). The machinery sector was
particularly hit. Further research into China’s thresholds for action include Sverdrup-Thygeson
(2015) tested whether or not China leverages economic relations with other countries in regards
to its interests. The author selected Norway as a case study due to the recent granting of the
Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiabo, much to the warning from China. The results showed not all
sectors are at risk to Chinese economic retaliation. Through extensive fieldwork and analyzing
specific sectors, the author is able to determine that the highly symbolic salmon sector was
targeted but did not target sectors that are difficult to source elsewhere and are critical to
continued Chinese economic growth, such as green technology (p. 116-117).
Little has been examined on how China responds to governments that meet with Uyghur
dissidents. Studying this case, with particular interest on Germany and Turkey due to their trade
importance to China, may provide insight into how China prioritizes between economic growth
and territorial integrity. Furthermore, this research may shed light on thresholds for action and
the importance of specific issues.
After examining the results, a pattern did emerge. Trade drops in all instances of
examination, except for one. When accounting for macro-economic and seasonal fluctuation
controls, the drops remained significant. However, CCP rhetoric, although observed, did not
necessarily appear to correlate with these drops in trade. The length of the drop in trade differed
between the instances and no clear pattern was derived from the timeframe of interest.
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Expected Findings:
This study expected four findings as a result of this research. Some research lends
credence to this expectations while others have not been uncovered with the application of the
above methodology.
1. Chinese leaders will explicitly threaten Turkish and German leaders with unspecified
repercussions for engaging with Uyghur activists and make clear such engagements will
harm relations with China.
This result was expected due to increased diplomatic and economic capacity, as well as a
growing sense that the CCP is willing to intervene to protect its core interests. As observed in
statements from China’s Foreign Ministry, explicit and ambiguous warnings were expected. It is
common to see statements voicing displeasure, but then no direct follow up on this
dissatisfaction other than that they may harm relations between China and the offending
government.
In an effort to test for this expectation, an author created rhetoric rating schema was applied.
The timeframe of interest was during and then two months after the event of interest, such as the
Dalai Lama meeting with the Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel. Instances of direct
language from CCP officials capture within the methodology applied returned observations for
two timeframes. Although not related to Uyghur dissidents, these instances serve to underscore
that CCP leaders do respond to perceived agitations past a certain threshold.
The first timeframe took place September 23, 2007 when the Dalai Lama met with Angela
Merkel, Chancellor of Germany and provincial level leaders. Leading up to the event, the
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson warned against contact between the two parties (BBC
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Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2007, p. 1). The rhetoric further escalated the day of the event with
several observations of strong language, entirely negative, aimed against the Dalai Lama meeting
with German officials. The Foreign Ministry spokesperson described a strong dissatisfaction
between the Dalai Lama meeting with Chancellor Merkel (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2007,
p. 1). The second observation occurred during the timeframe of interest around May 15-19, 2008.
The Dalai Lama met with Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, Federal Minister for Economic
Cooperation & Development of Germany and Norbert Lammert, Speaker of the German
Parliament, as well as a provincial leaders. The Foreign Ministry made clear that the CCP
remained “strongly” against allowing the Dalai Lama to use any platform for separatist activities
(“China Urges Germany not...”, Xinhua General News Service, 2008). Although not a direct
threat, this statement clarifies to the public the CCP’s stance on these meetings.
Although Chinese leaders did not explicitly threaten Germany or Turkey for hosting
Uyghur dissidents, this research highlights that CCP officials do respond in a negative tone to
certain perceived provocations. This possibly sheds light on threshold for action. The data shows
that the German government was subject to statements from the Foreign Ministry of China.
Although, this was only the case during the Dalai Lama’s visits. This is largely due to the
perceived capitulation of the Turkish government on issues surrounding this. In the case of the
Dalai Lama, he is the leader of the perceived Tibetan separatist movement. Rebiya Kadeer,
although as the head of the Uyghur separatist movement does not carry the same international
clout. From this, it appears that the Dalai Lama during the timeframe of this study was a greater
perceived threat to the CCP than Rebiya Kadeer.
2. Chinese leaders will not take punitive economic measures against Germany due to
Chinese sectors being dependent on German exports as inputs to produce exports.
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As stated, China’s dependence on certain inputs likely factors into any decision to retaliate
against Germany. However, actions taken against Germany, as is likely the case with the Dalai
lama, further show thresholds in retaliation. As is likely affirmed in Sverdrup-thygeson’s (2015)
research is that actions are not taken against certain countries when, by in the large, the exports
to China mainly come from sectors which are inputs to the Chinese economy and thus continued
economic growth.
This statement is largely held true. However, two instances were observed in trade flows with
Germany that showed a decline not correlated with macro-economic or seasonal fluctuation
controls. Unfortunately, two data points cannot constitute a trend. Yet, a clear pattern did not
emerhe. First, two observations create difficulty without other corroborating information to fully
analyze. Only two observations are included due to the nature of the visits between Rebiya
Kadeer and other German officials. Secondly, action taken against Germany for Uyghur
dissidents likely did not occur due to the focus on the Dalai Lama, especially in leading up to the
2008 Beijing Olympics.
While it appears that Chinese leaders have not taken punitive economic measures against
Germany, it appears likely due to threshold and ability to influence dissidents in other ways.
Schichor (2009, 2013) discusses at length the steps Chinese diplomats have taken to suppress
Uyghur activity in Germany and Turkey. It is possible that the lack of messaging in regards to
Uyghur separatist activity is because the CCP was able to message on individual Uyghur
separatists.
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3. Chinese leaders will not take punitive economic measures against Turkey because
Turkish leaders will cave to Chinese leaders’ warnings on resulting damage to ties
between the two countries.

This finding largely held true. There was no observed pattern on trade exports to China from
Turkey. In part, this may be because Turkish leaders are caving to Chinese demands. In 2003,
Erdogan arrived in China just prior to becoming Prime Minister of Turkey, there he reaffirmed
issues important to China such as “One-China,” at the same time, a Uyghur conference was
cancelled in Turkey, likely the result of Chinese pressure (Schichor, 2009, p. 1-2). As Schichor
(2009) finds, Uyghur dissidents have been exiting Turkey for Germany since the 1990’s due to
perceived lack of willingness on the part of Turkey to defend them against CCP pressure.

4. In the case of Germany and Turkey, Chinese leaders will snub the perceived offending
party by cancelling visas and trips for bilateral purposes.

These actions were not observed. It is likely, Chinese leaders snubbing the perceived
offending party is ranked higher than other means of pressure on foreign governments. However,
the issue of cancelling visas and trips for bilateral events may occur in a less public manner.
Post-2008 the issue of Rebiya Kadeer and her potential role in the Urumqi riots has only grown
of increasing interest to the CCP. However, during the timeframe of interest, 2002-2008, it does
not appear that Chinese leaders publicly snubbed either Germany or Turkey. Due to ability to
influence Uyghur dissidents via other means, and Turkish government capitulation, then from the
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perspective of the CCP, it was probably unnecessary to publicly snub leaders from the two
countries. Snubs on ongoing negotiations may been unseen by the public as well.

Authoritarian States versus Democratic States:
A significant finding of this study, as well as in the literature, is that China leverages its
economic relationships to influence decision making in other governments. Democratic states do
this as well, but as Wu (2009) argues, China is suited better than democratic states to bend
countries towards its interests, in part, due to its ability to cross-issue bargain (p. 84-85).
However, China, as well as other authoritarian states, are not uniquely adept at employing
economic statecraft.
The United States has a robust foreign aid program throughout the world. As will be
discussed in the following paragraph, part of this is to promote democracy abroad. Another
aspect of this foreign aid is to influence the security environment in which United States’
interests exist. A recent example of the United States employing economic statecraft, is the
recent decision by the Trump administration to cut a portion of defense aid to Pakistan. As stated
by United States’ officials, the government of Pakistan has failed to intervene in an effective
manner against insurgents in different parts of the country (Ryan and Gowen, 2018, p. 4). These
actions demonstrate, that democratic states, like the United States, use economic statecraft to
influence other government policies.
Collins (2009) explores the United States’ approach to promoting democracy abroad and
the economic levels used. As the author discusses, much research has examined military
approaches to democracy promotion, but this author’s work looks at how economic statecraft,
specifically aid and trade privileges, is used to promote the United States’ interests (p. 367). One
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strategy the United States uses is politically conditional foreign aid, or more simply, expecting
the receipt to make measurable progress on some measure to continue receiving aid, such as
democracy (p. 371). An explicit requirement of continuing to receive aid is unlikely to be overtly
seen from authoritarian states who nonetheless likely attach strings to their aid (e.g., Chinese
investment in African countries).
Another example of leveraging economic relationships is found in preferential trade
agreements. For example, the European Union has requirements on the democratic process
before being admitted into the economic union (Collins, 2009, p. 375). This represents
influencing the decision making of other governments through offering carrots, not sticks.
However, regression in these principles could lead to the expulsion of a member state thus
punitive measures could be leveraged in such an instance. Similarly, the United States has added
‘rights’ requirements to its free trade agreements, such as with Jordan in 2001 and more recently
with Peru in 2007 (Collins, 2009, p. 375).
China, likewise, uses similar approaches to influence other governments’ policy. The One
Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative—also known as the Twenty-first century maritime silk road, is
to provide common growth and development across areas of Southeast Asia (Nie, 2016, p. 423).
This signature foreign policy proposal by Xi Jinping would interconnect areas of Africa, Asia,
the Middle East, and Europe (Gebauer, 2017, p. 51). One aspect of this initiative would expand
land routes of trade from China to Europe, in the process creating new areas of economic growth
with China at the center (Gebauer, 2017, p. 52). The countries that are part of this initiative are
expected to economically benefit, including large markets such as the European Union and
Russia (Gebauer, 2017, p. 54-55).
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In addition to expected economic benefits, the CCP has allocated significant funds to
infrastructure development. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank will fund projects, such as it did in Pakistan during construction in the ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (Gebauer, 2017, p. 56). An implication of this initiative by China is
further integrating the global economy under Chinese influence. However a more significant and
likely outcome is that there will be increased economic dependence on China, both as a market
and investor, this leaves receipt governments more vulnerable to Chinese economic statecraft.
Another implication of trade initiatives can lead to further integration, acquisition, and
mergers between corporations as trade barriers are lowered. Du and Zhang (2018) find that in
the wake of the OBOR initiative Chinese firms are increasingly merging and acquiring
corporations in these countries, further integrating the two economies (p. 204-205). If, for
instance, the CCP wanted to take punitive measures against another government in the OBOR
initiative, it could do so through its acquisitions in these countries. Furthermore, as a large
investor, the CCP, through its state-owned-enterprises, can deeply influence other policies but
the efficacy of this remains unseen. It appears, that both democratic and authoritarian states
leverage trade relationships through carrots and sticks to promote their interests abroad.
Although CCP carrots, or other economic initiatives, are not explicitly within the scope
of this study, some findings can be derived for the time periods analyzed. For instance, when the
Dalai Lama visited Germany in 2008, several leaders refused to meet with him. It was during this
time that China and Germany reiterated their willingness to work on human rights issues, a
perceived sign of progress between the two countries. It appears that the willingness of Beijing
leaders to engage with other countries on certain topics, particularly democratic states as the
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example just given, shows that the CCP can offer carrots when the other party return the favor.
In this example, several German officials not meeting with the Dalai Lama.
Other Findings:
Research demonstrates that the CCP is engaged in a strategy to influence foreign
governments through economic incentive and punishment. Although not unique to China, it is
probable that the CCP could quickly leverage multiple elements of the government, including
state-owned-enterprises, to incentive other states’ policy through additional investment, or
discourage through raising import requirements to cancelling previous economic incentives
offered. Given the continued growth of the CCP’s economic initiatives, including the OBOR, it
would seem likely that the CCP will and is leveraging relationships in other areas.
Du and Zhang’s (2018) findings on Chinese companies acquisition of other companies
sheds light on probable areas of influence. Investment in other states, such as Kazakhstan,
influences how citizens perceive power and influence, as well as the importance of the investing
state (Chia-Yi, 2015, p. 71-72). However, increased influence does not always correlate with
positive perception of China from the local people, as Chia-Yi (2015) finds (p., 73). Areas of
recent investment from China, Latin America and Africa, will be under increasing political and
economic influence, but it remains to be seen how citizens of these countries view the CCP’s
influence.
Increasingly, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the CCP’s foreign policy appears to be
moving in a more aggressive direction. Actions include a multitude of new trade initiatives and
threats to punish other countries. In the months and years to come, it could be expected that
claimants to area in the South China Sea who push their claims, will be on the receiving end of
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CCP economic threats. The economic reliance on China makes certain issues difficult to pursue
another foreign policy direction.
Further Areas for Research:
Recognizing the CCP’s moves to influence other states through carrots and sticks should
be studied more holistically. One, the growing toolkit from which the CCP can draw has
drastically grown in the previous years. The time period of examination in this study, 2002-2008,
captures a China with growing diplomatic and economic clout but does not examine 2009 to
present which would capture China after the worldwide recession and Xi Jinping’s accession to
leadership. Both, may produce a greater number of data points to analyze which can then be
turned into a trendline for CCP behavior and reaction.
In examining Uyghurs specifically, two further areas of recommendation are proposed.
Again, the timeframe of interest. The time period analyzed looks at CCP responses to Uyghur
behavior prior to the 2009 Urumqi riots when CCP willingness to incentive and influence other
states may have shifted due to the severity of the events which took place. Furthermore, field
research to countries which may be on the receiving end of Chinese economic statecraft may
lend credence to the results of CCP and to the full extent they are occurring.
Other areas to examine include how the CCP responds to Taiwanese activists and exerts
pressure on other governments. An additional area to expand on are on the potential differences
in Chinese responses to border states versus non-border states. A proposed question using the
Dalai Lama is if the CCP is less likely to leverage trade as an issue with border states than nonborder states and instead leverage territorial disputes. Other areas to examine may include
African countries which have received large investment from the Chinese government or
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Chinese corporations and to the extent policy and public opinion has shifted as a result. On a
larger scale, an examination to of how democratic states leverage economic statecraft and the
efficacy of such actions can be weighed against the approach of authoritarian states and which
responds more effectively and quickly.
In studying other areas of authoritarian or CCP influence, the methodology in this paper
is beneficial to capture authoritarian states messaging on critical perceived threats. However, this
methodology lacks in capturing holistic diplomatic efforts which may fall below the threshold of
public messaging. For instance, Schichor’s (2009) work describes how Chinese diplomats have
attempted to pressure the Turkish government and been successful in stopping some events. In
this case, field research with stakeholders, such as government and business members, could
potentially corroborate claims of CCP actions. Further establishing thresholds for action may
shed light on diplomatic approaches authoritarian states are likely to take. Examining the
potential contrast and response from democratic states versus authoritarian on these core issues
could allow stakeholders to better compromise and work between these core issues.
Conclusion:
China's economic, military, and diplomatic rise continues to reshape the framework of
East Asia, as well as China's interaction with other governments. The increasing prowess of the
second largest economy in the world continues to tilt other government attention to East Asia. A
growing capacity to act on its interests, leaves China as a power which can influence other
governments' policies, including domestic policy, to its liking. Understanding China's responses
to perceived threats to its interests are crucial for policy makers, interests groups, and academics
as they learn what is most vital to China and its leaders. This study finds that levels of threshold
are present in Chinese responses to perceived dissident threats. The conclusion of this study help
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answer how authoritarian states prioritize responses to core interest challenges and levels of
threshold for Chinese action against other governments. This study demonstrates that China has
thresholds for action, probably based on perceived threat.
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